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ABSTRACT
In July 2005 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice
mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic choices facing
parents. This paper presents the empirical case against the previous Boston mechanism, a priority
matching mechanism, and the case in favor of the change to a strategy-proof mechanism. Using
detailed records on student choices and assignments, we present evidence both of sophisticated
strategic behavior among some parents, and of unsophisticated strategic behavior by others. We find
evidence that some parents pay close attention to the capacity constraints of different schools, while
others appear not to. In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been assigned
to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current mechanism. This interaction
between sophisticated and unsophisticated players identifies a new rationale for strategy-proof
mechanisms based on fairness, and was a critical argument in Boston's decision to change the
mechanism. We then discuss the considerations that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance
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sonmezt@bc.edu1 Introduction
In July of 2005 the Boston School Committee, the governing body of the Boston Public
Schools, voted to replace the existing school choice mechanism (henceforth the Boston
mechanism) with an alternative mechanism that removes the incentives to \game the
system" that handicapped the Boston mechanism. This followed two years of intensive
discussion and analysis of the existing school choice system and the behavior it elicited,
as well as a discussion of two di®erent possible replacement school choice mechanisms.1
The authors of the present paper were ¯rst invited to meet with members of the Boston
Public Schools (BPS) strategic planning team in October, 2003, following a Boston Globe
story (Cook 2003) highlighting some of the vulnerabilities of the Boston mechanism as
analyzed by Abdulkadiro¸ glu and SÄ onmez (2003) and Chen and SÄ onmez (2003), and com-
paring the Boston mechanism unfavorably with the clearinghouse used to match medical
residents to hospitals (Roth 1984, Roth and Peranson 1998). In that meeting, we
1. presented theoretical, historical, and experimental evidence about the vulnerabil-
ity of the Boston mechanism to preference misrepresentation (Abdulkadiro¸ glu and
SÄ onmez 2003, Chen and SÄ onmez 2003, Roth 1991),
2. explained how such \gaming" may harm the system in many ways including through
reduced e±ciency, and
3. presented the outlines of two alternative mechanisms which are strategy-proof and
hence immune to preference manipulation: a student-proposing deferred acceptance
mechanism like that now used to match residents to hospitals, and a top trading
cycles mechanism.
Loosely speaking, the Boston mechanism attempts to assign as many students as
possible to their ¯rst choice school, and only after all such assignments have been made
does it consider assignments of students to their second choices, etc. The problem with
this is that if a student does not gain admission to his ¯rst choice school, it may be that
his second choice is already ¯lled to capacity with students who listed it as their ¯rst
choice. That is, a student may fail to get a place in his second choice school that would
have been available had he listed that school as his ¯rst choice. This has the potential
both to change the preference rankings that some families submit, and to work to the
disadvantage of families that fail to take into account such strategic considerations.
The Boston mechanism is one of a class of \priority mechanisms" that were tried
to match medical graduates to \house o±cer" positions in various regions of the British
National Health Service and eventually abandoned because that whole class of mechanisms
su®ers from the same kind of incentive problems as the Boston mechanism (Roth 1990,
1991).
1A school choice mechanism is a function that assigns students to schools for each school choice problem.
Algorithms implement mechanisms. We will sometimes (ab)use the terms mechanism and algorithm as syn-
onyms.
2Based on the evidence, BPS sta® were willing to entertain the possibility that Boston
families might be engaged in strategic behavior through preference manipulation.2 How-
ever, they wanted us to demonstrate this, and examine its consequences empirically, in
the Boston data. To this end, they provided us with micro-level datasets on the choices,
student characteristics, and school characteristics, and pressed us to make the empirical
case for changing the Boston mechanism.
This paper presents the results of this exercise and describes the arguments for chang-
ing the Boston mechanism. We show that while the adoption of either strategy-proof
mechanism would not have an adverse impact on student assignments if indeed there is
little strategizing (or if the amount of strategizing only slowly declines after a new mech-
anism is introduced), there is evidence of strategic behavior among at least some of the
families. While we cannot know if any particular preference list re°ects a given family's
true preferences, we will show that the pattern of submitted preferences, particularly in
connection with the most desirable schools, re°ects in broad outline the patterns that
would be predicted if families are taking into account the strategic incentives that the
Boston mechanism gives them.
However we also show that there are families that have been harmed under the Boston
mechanism by reporting their preferences in a sincere way or by strategizing inadequately.
For this purpose we concentrate particularly on students who did not receive any of their
listed choices, and show that many of these students could have been assigned to one of
their stated choices had they ranked the schools di®erently.
Since we do not know students' true preferences, we will not be able to assess directly
any ine±ciency in the current allocation. But to the extent that families are not reporting
their true preferences, and only imperfectly strategizing, the indirect evidence will be
strong that the outcome is ine±cient.
Once presented with these various kinds of evidence, BPS sta® was convinced that
adoption of a strategy-proof mechanism is in the best interest of Boston Public Schools,
and in May 2005 Superintendent Thomas Payzant recommended adoption of one of the
strategy-proof mechanisms to the School Committee. On July 20, 2005, the School Com-
mittee unanimously voted to adopt the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.
Given the widespread use of the Boston mechanism and its variants in public school
choice, the paper will also review aspects of the dialog that was ultimately successful in
convincing policymakers to change the school choice mechanism, highlighting the role of
strategy-proofness.
2Throughout the paper, we de¯ne strategic behavior or strategizing as submitting a preference list to the
assignment mechanism that di®ers from the true preferences.
32 The Boston Mechanism
In Boston, students are assigned seats at public schools through a centralized student
assignment mechanism.3 In the spring of each school year, students who seek a spot in
Kindergarten,4 Grades 1, 6, and 9 are asked to submit a preference ranking of schools.
(In Boston, students are allowed to rank no more than ¯ve schools.) Students in the
remaining non-transition grades continue on in their current school unless they request
and receive a transfer.
For most schools, for half of the seats at a given school the students are priority ordered
as follows:
1. Students who are guaranteed a space at the school by virtue of already attending
that school or a feeder school (guaranteed priority),
2. students who have a sibling at the school and live in the walk zone of the school5
(sibling-walk priority),
3. students who have a sibling at the school (but who do not live in the walk zone of
the school) (sibling priority),
4. students who live in the walk zone of the school (but who do not have a sibling at
the school) (walk zone priority), and
5. other students in the zone.
A random lottery number is used to break the ties in each category (random tie-
breaker).
For the other half of the seats, students are priority-ordered based on guaranteed
and sibling priority and the random tie-breaker. (That is, students who live in the walk
zone of a given school can have priority for half of the spaces, and the other half are
allocated without any priority for living in the walk zone.) Students who are not in the
main transition grades continue on in their current school through guaranteed priority.
Guaranteed priority is also given to students in transition grades who attend combined
elementary and middle schools (grades K2-8) or middle and high schools (grades 6-12).
The district is divided into three zones, East zone, North zone and West zone. Most of the
elementary and middle schools are registered as zone schools, which admit students only
3There are several special admission high schools that process applicants separately. These include schools
that require an interview or presentation of a portfolio such as the Boston Arts Academy and three exam schools
(Boston Latin School, Boston Latin Academy, and O'Bryant School of Mathematics and Science) which admit
students based on grade point average or scores on an entrance examination.
4Boston public schools have three di®erent entering levels for kindergarten. These grades, K0, K1, and K2,
depend on the age of the student as of September 1st of the entering school year. K0 programs are for children
who turn 3 years old by September 1st, K1 programs are for children who turn 4 years old, and K2 programs
are for children who turn 5.
5Students who live within 1 mile from elementary school, within 1.5 miles from middle school, and within 2
miles from high school are considered to be in the walk zone of a school.
4from their zone. A few elementary schools and middle schools are registered as citywide
schools, to which students from all zones can apply. All high schools are citywide.6
Based on preferences, priorities and school capacities student assignments are deter-
mined with the following algorithm:
Step 1: In Step 1 only the ¯rst choices of the students are considered. For each school,
consider the students who have listed it as their ¯rst choice and assign seats of the school
to these students one at a time following their priority order until either there are no seats
left or there is no student left who has listed it as his ¯rst choice.7
In general,
Step k: In Step k only the kth choices of the students not previously assigned are consid-
ered. For each school with still available seats, assign the remaining seats to the students
who have listed it as their kth choice, one at a time following their priority order, until
either there are no seats left or there is no student left who has listed it as her kth choice.
The procedure terminates after any step k when every student is assigned a seat at a
school, or if the only students who remain unassigned listed no more than k choices.
The following simple example illustrates how the Boston mechanism works.
Example 1: Let I = fi1;i2;i3;i4;i5;i6g be the set of students, S = fa;b;c;dg be the set
of schools, and q = (2;2;1;1) be the school capacity vector. Student priorities at schools
as well as their preferences are as follows:
a : i5 ¡ i1 ¡ i2 ¡ i3 :::
b : i5 ¡ i6 ¡ i3 :::
c : i4 ¡ i5 ¡ i6 :::
d : i5 ¡ i6 :::
Pi1 : a:::
Pi2 : a:::
Pi3 : a ¡ b:::
Pi4 : c:::
Pi5 : c ¡ a ¡ b ¡ d
Pi6 : c ¡ a ¡ b ¡ d
Step 1: Only the ¯rst choices of students are considered and those with higher priorities
are accommodated. Each of students i1 and i2 is assigned a seat at school a; i4 is assigned
a seat at school c. At the end of Step 1, b has 2 and d has 1 seat available; students i3,
i5, and i6 are unassigned.
Step 2: Remaining students are considered for their second choices. There is no seat left
at school a so students i5, i6 will not be accommodated in this round (too bad for student
i5 who lost the highest priority at school a) and student i3 is assigned at seat at school b.
6The details of the entire priority structure are in Appendix 1.
7For schools with walk zone priority for half of the seats, the school is treated as two identical schools, each
half the size of the original school, only one of which gives priority to students from the walk zone. Students
are assumed to prefer the half that gives walk zone priority, and both halves of the school are adjacent in each
student's preferences.
5Therefore at the end of Step 2, each of schools b, d has 1 seat available and students i5,
i6 are unassigned.
Step 3: Remaining students are considered for their third choices and student i5 is assigned
a seat at school b. At the end of Step 3, school d has 1 seat available and student i6 is
unassigned.
Step 4: The only remaining student i6 is assigned a seat at his forth choice school d.
Therefore the outcome of the Boston mechanism is:
Ã
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
a a b c b d
!
:
Note that in the above example student i5, who is assigned a seat at her third choice
school b, can secure a seat at her second choice school a by ranking it as her top choice:
The Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof; that is, students (or their parents) may
improve their assignments by misrepresenting their preferences.
This itself would not be very disturbing had such manipulation been a remote pos-
sibility. For many mechanisms which are not strategy-proof, successfully manipulating
the mechanism would require information that a student might not have. The problem
is more severe for the Boston mechanism. Since a student who ranks a school as her
second choice loses her priority to students who rank it as their ¯rst choices, it is very
risky for the student to \waste" her ¯rst choice at a highly sought after school if she has
relatively low priority. Hence the Boston mechanism gives students and their parents a
strong incentive to misrepresent their preferences by improving the ranking of schools for
which they have high priority.8
There are many signs that both the school district and families are aware that students
may not always want to rank schools truthfully. The BPS school guide [2004, p3] explicitly
advises parents to strategize when submitting their preferences (quotes in original):
For a better chance of your \¯rst choice" school ::: consider choosing less popu-
lar schools. Ask Family Resource Center sta® for information on \underchosen"
schools.
Moreover, other school districts that employ variants of the Boston mechanism make sim-
ilar suggestions (for examples from other school districts, see Ergin and SÄ onmez (2003)).
Although it may be di±cult to identify an optimal strategy, there are many strategies
that might produce better results than truthful revelation of preferences for a family
whose top choices are overdemanded schools. Ranking an underdemanded school as the
8While students are exogenously priority ordered at each school, the \e®ective priorities" are endogenous
under the Boston mechanism in the sense that each student who ranks a school as her kth choice is considered
before each student who ranks it (k+1)st. The exogenous priorities are only utilized to tie-break among students
who have ranked a school at the same rank order. It is this ability of students to in°uence the e®ective priorities
that makes the Boston mechanism vulnerable to preference manipulation.
6¯rst choice, as suggested by BPS, is one such possibility. Another possibility is ranking the
¯rst choice truthfully and choosing an underdemanded second choice (or, more generally,
ranking as ¯rst choice a desirable overdemanded school for which the student has su±cient
priority to have a chance of admission, and ranking a less preferred underdemanded school
second).
In Boston, a parent group which meets to discuss student assignment, the West Zone
Parent Group, recommends both kinds of strategies. Their introductory meeting minutes
on 10/27/03 state:
One school choice strategy is to ¯nd a school you like that is undersubscribed
and put it as a top choice, OR, ¯nd a school that you like that is popular and
put it as a ¯rst choice and ¯nd a school that is less popular for a \safe" second
choice.
Whether either type of manipulation makes sense for a particular student depends
on many factors including how popular her top choices are, her priorities at schools, and
her attitude towards \risk." Among experimental subjects, both rules-of-thumb are fairly
common (Chen and SÄ onmez 2003). The Appendix contains other illustrative quotes from
this parent group about strategic decision-making in the submission of preferences.
Note that the restriction in Boston that students may list no more than ¯ve schools
introduces another way in which students may not be able to state their true preferences,
since a family that has visited more than ¯ve schools must immediately make a choice
about which ones to list.
3 Two Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Before looking at the Boston data, we ¯rst review the two alternative mechanisms we
proposed, the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycles mechanism. In
both mechanisms, students may submit preference lists containing as many schools as
they wish.
The deferred acceptance algorithm was ¯rst studied by Gale and Shapley (1962) in
the context of two-sided matching markets, i.e. markets in which there are two kinds of
agents needing to be matched to one another. It produces stable matchings, i.e. matchings
with the property that there do not exist two agents, not matched to one another, who
would both prefer to be matched to one another. Its principal incentive properties were
established for simple, one-to-one matching by Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth
(1982), and for many to one matching problems of the kind we study here (in which
each school admits many students, each of whom is admitted only to one school) by Roth
(1985) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990).9 For many-to-one matching problems, there does
9More recently, Abdulkadiro¸ glu (2005) extends the incentive results in a model with type-speci¯c quotas,
which also applies to the controlled school choice problem in which choice is restricted by racial quotas at
7not exist any stable matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for the schools, but the
student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for the students.
A decade before deferred acceptance algorithms were ¯rst formally studied, it turns
out that the market for medical residents had developed a clearinghouse which uses an
algorithm that is \outcome equivalent" to the hospital-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm (Roth 1984, 1995). (That is, they were using a di®erent algorithm but the
same mechanism.) More recently, versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm have
become widely used in centralized clearinghouses that serve two-sided matching markets.
Some examples include not only medical residents in the U.S., U.K., and Canada (Roth
1990, 1991), but a variety of more advanced medical positions (including the fellowship
positions through which doctors become certi¯ed into di®erent medical subspecialties; see
e.g. Niederle and Roth 2003a,b, 2005), the markets for a number of other medical and
health care professionals (see e.g. Table 1 in Roth and Rothblum, 1999), and even newly
graduating Reform Rabbis (Bodin and Panken, 1999). And at the time we ¯rst spoke to
BPS, New York City was in the process of replacing its decentralized system of high school
admissions with a centralized clearinghouse based on the deferred acceptance algorithm
(Abdulkadiro¸ glu, Pathak, and Roth 2005a,b). In this respect New York City schools
resembled most of the other matching markets in which centralized clearinghouses have
been introduced, in that a centralized clearinghouse was replacing a failing decentralized
matching process, and the agents on both sides of the market, e.g. hospitals and medical
graduates, or high schools and students, were both active players in the process.
The situation in Boston in 2003 was quite di®erent. Boston already had a centralized
school choice mechanism. And in Boston, only the students and their families were active
players, the schools were passive, with priorities set by the central administration. That
is, in Boston, school choice does not involve two kinds of agents who make choices: only
the students make choices, by submitting their preference lists. The priorities that they
have at each school are ¯xed in advance.
Abdulkadiro¸ glu and SÄ onmez (2003) observed that priorities students have at each
school can be formally treated as school preferences, and hence two-sided matching mech-
anisms have their counterparts in the context of school choice problems as in Boston. They
also observed that the stability axiom of two-sided matching markets is isomorphic in the
context of school choice to what they referred as elimination of justi¯ed envy, i.e. there
should not be a student who prefers to his assignment a school that either has a vacant
seat or has admitted a student with lower priority. Since only students are strategic agents
in Boston, the student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof in this
context, but its outcome may not be Pareto e±cient (when one only considers the welfare
of students), although it Pareto dominates any other matching that eliminates justi¯ed
schools. Hat¯eld and Milgrom (2005) obtains the incentive results in a model of matching with contracts which
incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model,
and ascending package auctions.
8envy. Abdulkadiro¸ glu and SÄ onmez (2003) also considered a Pareto e±cient mechanism
based on the method of top trading cycles, introduced in Shapley and Scarf (1974), and
further studied by Roth and Postlewaite (1977). In the original context of \housing mar-
kets" Roth (1982b) showed that this method is strategy-proof and Abdulkadiro¸ glu and
SÄ onmez (1999) showed how to extend it to more complex allocation problems. At the time
we ¯rst met with BPS, discussions were underway to organize what eventually became
the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, based on a proposal for a version of the
top trading cycles mechanism outlined in Roth, SÄ onmez, and Ä Unver (2004).
So, at the time of our initial meeting, we were in a position to o®er two di®erent kinds
of strategy-proof mechanisms that seemed suitable for consideration in Boston school
choice. They work as follows.
1. Student-Proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism
As we have already mentioned, it is costly under the Boston mechanism to list a ¯rst
choice that you do not succeed in getting because, once other students are assigned their
¯rst-choice places, they cannot be displaced even by a student with higher priority. This
is avoided under the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. For a given
list of priorities, student preferences and school capacities, this mechanism determines a
student assignment with the following algorithm:
Step 1: Each student \proposes" to her ¯rst choice. Each school tentatively assigns
its seats to its proposers one at a time in their priority order. Any remaining proposers
are rejected.
In general, at
Step k: Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next choice
if one remains. Each school considers the set consisting of the students it has been holding
and its new proposers, and tentatively assigns its seats to these students one at a time in
priority order. Any students in the set remaining after all the seats are ¯lled are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no student proposal is rejected, and each student is
assigned her ¯nal tentative assignment.
In contrast with the Boston algorithm, the above deferred acceptance algorithm assigns
seats only tentatively at each step, so students with higher priorities may be considered
in subsequent steps. Consequently it is stable in the sense that there is no student who
loses a seat to a lower priority student and receives a less-preferred assignment. Moreover
all students prefer their outcome to any other stable matching (Gale and Shapley 1962)
and the induced mechanism is strategy-proof (Roth 1985).
2. Top Trading Cycles mechanism.
9If the intention of the school board is that priorities be \strictly enforced," the
student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is a leading candidate.10 However,
if welfare considerations apply only to students, there is tension between stability and
Pareto optimality (Roth 1982, Balinski and SÄ onmez 1999, Abdulkadiro¸ glu and SÄ onmez
2003). If priorities are merely a device for allocating scarce spaces, it might be possible
to assign students to schools they prefer by allowing them to trade their priority at
one school with a student who has priority at a school they prefer. The top trading
cycles mechanism (TTC) creates a virtual exchange for priorities. For a given list of
priorities, student preferences and school capacities this mechanism determines a student
assignment with the following algorithm:
Step 1: Assign counters for each school to track how many seats remain available.
Each student points to her favorite school and each school points to the student with the
highest priority. There must be at least one cycle. (A cycle is an ordered list of schools
and students (student 1 - school 1 - student 2 - ... - student k - school k) with student 1
pointing to school 1, school 1 to student 2, ..., student k to school k, and school k pointing
to student 1.) Each student is part of at most one cycle. Every student in a cycle is
assigned a seat at the school she points to and is removed. The counter of each school is
reduced by one and if it reaches zero, the school is removed.
In general, at
Step k: Each remaining student points to her favorite school among the remaining
schools and each remaining school points to the student with highest priority among the
remaining students. There is at least one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned a
seat at the school she points to and is removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is
reduced by one and if it reaches zero, the school is removed.
The procedure terminates when each student is assigned a seat or all submitted choices
have been considered.
This version of the TTC mechanism was introduced by Abdulkadiro¸ glu and SÄ onmez
(2003) and is an extension of Gale's top trading cycles mechanism described in Shapley
and Scarf (1974). Many properties of TTC carry over to school choice including Pareto
e±ciency (Shapley and Scarf 1974) and strategy-proofness (Roth 1982b).
While the TTC is a Pareto e±cient mechanism when only students are considered, and
the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is not, the former does not Pareto
dominate the latter. One implication is, based on a stronger e±ciency notion (such as
a cardinal e±ciency notion relying on the rank order of schools) the student-proposing
deferred acceptance mechanism may perform better than the TTC for some problems. For
10In Turkey admissions to colleges (public or private) is through a similar centralized clearinghouse where
priorities are \earned" based on some exams and hence should be strictly enforced. Hence student-proposing
deferred acceptance mechanism is especially appealing in this context (Balinski and SÄ onmez 1999).
10example, the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism may assign more students
to their ¯rst choices than TTC. Moreover while each Nash equilibrium outcome of the
complete information preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism is
weakly Pareto dominated by each dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the student-
proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (Ergin and SÄ onmez 2003), equilibrium outcomes
induced by the Boston mechanism and TTC are not Pareto ranked.
4 Data
4.1 Data construction
All data for this paper were provided by Boston Public Schools from their assignment
system or the school guide for the corresponding year. The data include student choices
and assignments and school priorities and capacities.
The last major change to the student assignment algorithm in Boston occurred in 1999.
Prior to that, the assignment mechanism was based on a system of quotas on race and
other factors. The new assignment system adopted in 2000-01 and described in Section 2
has stayed mostly the same through the most recent assignment year 2004-05.11 To avoid
the complications with the transition from the old quota-based admissions plan, we focus
our empirical analysis on the second year of the current system, school year 2001-02.12
In the 2001-2002 school year, students in transition grades submitted their application
by February for a school spot beginning September 1st of that year. In this paper, we
focus on students in the main transition grades: K2, 6, and 9.13
The actual assignment system has three rounds with the majority of students partici-
pating in the ¯rst round. Students who submit preferences in round 2 and 3 are mostly
those who have missed the ¯rst assignment deadline. Although there might in principle
be a strategic aspect to which round a student submits her application, students will be
better o® applying in the ¯rst round because this is when the largest number of school
seats are available.14 Indeed, Boston Public Schools strongly encourages students to apply
11The only changes have been minor modi¯cations to a handful of walk-zone boundaries.
12Results for other school years remain largely the same.
13Although grades K0, K1, and 1 are also considered transition years by BPS, for simplicity we do not consider
these students here. For K0 and K1, there are a very limited number of school spots and BPS does not guarantee
students a spot. For instance, in 2001-02, there were 654 applicants for 141 K0 spots, and 78% of applicants
were unassigned. There were 1,530 applicants for 546 K1 spots, and 64% were unassigned. We do not focus on
grade 1 because the vast majority of students stay in the elementary school to which they were assigned a K2
place. In 2001-02, 83% of grade 1 spots were guaranteed to continuing students.
14If a school's capacity is ¯lled after round 1, its seats are not available for new students in round 2. Moreover,
if there is attrition due, say, to students leaving the system to enter private school or moving out of the school
system, students in round 1 who were not admitted to that school have higher priority than students entering
in later rounds. Therefore, if a student is able to obtain a spot by submitting preferences in the second round,
she should also have been able to obtain a seat in the ¯rst round.
11by the ¯rst deadline and informs families that their choices are more limited the longer
they wait (see e.g. Boston School Guide, 2001, page 5). As a result, we focus on students
submitting preferences in round 1. In 2001-02, 83% of assignments for grade K2, 94% of
assignments for grade 6, and 89% of assignments for grade 9 took place in the ¯rst round.
The ¯nal population consists of students with a valid application form in the ¯rst
round for 2001-02. More details on data construction are in the appendix.
4.2 Summary statistics
The city of Boston is divided into three zones: the East, North, and West. At the
elementary and middle school level, students are only eligible to apply to schools in the
zone where they live, and citywide schools. Figure 1 shows how these zones cover the
geography of the city. The ¯gure also shows the location of elementary schools for students
applying for a school place in 2002. While the geography of the East and West zones are
contiguous, the North zone is separated from them and divided into three parts by water.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the number of students and schools across
zones. There are almost three times as many elementary schools as middle schools, and
only 12 high schools. Elementary schools average a little under 40 students per incoming
class, while middle schools average almost 190 and high schools have more than 530
students per class.
Table 2 presents more information on student characteristics. At all entry points,
the fraction of students receiving a free or reduced price lunch is between 60%-80%.
Table 2 shows that the concentration of black students is highest in the East zone, and
the overall school population is over 80% non-white. The North zone has the highest
concentration of hispanic students and other students who are mainly Asian students
living near Chinatown. The high percentage of these two groups also accounts for the
relatively higher fraction of students who are bilingual in the North zone at elementary
school.
The last column of Table 2 shows the percentage of students who submitted appli-
cations who withdrew from the public school system. The ratio is slightly higher in the
West zone. Since the West zone tends to have higher overall income (i.e. fewer students
receiving subsidized lunch), this may be due to a greater fraction of families who can
a®ord to send their child to private or parochial school. However, there is no clear pat-
tern at middle school where the overall percent who withdraw decreases to 11% and is
comparable to the other zones.
Table 3 presents which stated choice students received from the Boston mechanism. In
grades K2, 6, and 9, between 92%-95% of students were assigned to a school of their choice,
with between 77% and 86% of students receiving their stated top choice. Commentators
have have often used stated preferences to evaluate the performance of choice plans. For
instance, in his description of public school choice in Massachusetts, Glenn (1991) writes:
A majority of students are accepted into their ¯rst choice schools. For example,
12in 1991, 74 percent of sixth graders were assigned to their ¯rst choice school,
10 percent to their second choice, and 15 percent to schools they did not select.
Cookson (1994) discusses the school choice plan in Cambridge, which uses a version of
the Boston mechanism, and states:
91% of all students entering the Cambridge public school system at the K-8
levels have gained admissions to schools of their choice, 75% to the school of
their ¯rst choice, and 16% to either their second or third choice.
On the surface, the high fraction of students receiving their top choice might suggest
that the mechanism is performing well, and/or that matching demand and supply is easy
because preferences are dispersed. Indeed, the ability to tell the public that a high propor-
tion of students receive their top choices may be a reason for the widespread popularity of
the Boston mechanism. However, given the incentives of the Boston mechanism, treating
stated choices as true choices does not give an accurate depiction of the performance of
the mechanism. It would be a mistake, for instance, to conclude that 80% of students in
Boston are satis¯ed with their assignment based on numbers that might not re°ect the
true preferences. Experimental evidence, suggests that a substantial fraction of partici-
pants might not reveal their choices truthfully under the Boston mechanism (Chen and
SÄ onmez 2003).
The table also shows that the fraction of elementary school students receiving their
¯rst choice is about 10% lower in the West zone, and the fraction of students who are
unassigned is higher. The greater competition in the West Zone may be due to parent
groups such as the West Zone Parents Group advising families to choose their top choice
as their true choice, and choosing a safe second choice. The higher fraction of unassigned
is also consistent with parents in the West zone ranking hard to get schools and if they
do not receive them, leaving the public school system.
Table 4 shows the priority through which students are assigned. At the elementary
school level, about 16% of students are assigned to their guaranteed choice. This fraction
increases to 29% and 52% at the middle and high school level. The reason for this is
that at the K2 entry point, the students who are guaranteed their choice are mainly those
who were fortunate enough to obtain a school placement for grade K1 and are continuing
on in the same elementary school. For grade 6, there are a number of K2-8 schools and
students in grade 5 at the school are guaranteed a spot for grade 6. For high school, the
high fraction of guaranteed priority students is accounted for by both continuing students
and because students who live in East Boston are guaranteed a spot at East Boston High
School.
Among the students who do not use their guaranteed priority, the majority of students
are assigned either through walk zone priority or without priority. Sibling-walk or sibling
priority account for more assignments at elementary school than middle and high school,
but for a smaller fraction of the total priority than walk or no priority students. At high
13school walk zone priority is lower because there are only 8 high schools, and applicants
can apply from all over the city and are not restricted to their zone. Across grade levels,
between 26% and 31% of students are assigned to a school without priority.
5 Strategic and Unsophisticated Behavior
We will present evidence that at least some families are responding to the incentives to
manipulate their preferences. We will also consider how the di®erent mechanisms would
perform if in fact the preferences currently being submitted are in fact very close to the
true preferences.
5.1 Applicant strategies
In Boston, students were allowed to rank up to ¯ve schools and the Boston School Guide
recommends that parents \choose at least three schools" (2001, page 4). Table 5 presents
the basic facts on student applicant forms. Inspection of the table shows that over 75% of
students in grade K2 follow BPS's suggestion and rank at least three schools. This fraction
drops to 61% and 46% for middle and high schools. This di®erence can be accounted for
by the greater number of seats allocated via guaranteed priority for middle and high
school. This fact also explains why there are a sizable number of students ranking only
one school for middle and high school, since the majority of these students ranked only
their guaranteed choice ¯rst. Many of these students are opting to stay in their grade
K2-8 or 6-12 schools.
Between 7%-20% of students ranked the maximum allowed ¯ve schools on their choice
form. Given that the Boston mechanism considers ¯rst choices before any second choices,
the low number of students who ranked ¯ve schools is unsurprising. As Table 3 showed,
less than 1% of students were assigned to their ¯fth choice.15
For a given year, de¯ne a school to be overdemanded if the number of students
who rank that school as their ¯rst choice is greater than the number of seats at the
school. These are schools whose seats are all assigned before the ¯rst round of the Boston
algorithm is over (and hence no student who ranks these schools second or lower receives
a seat at these schools).
The anecdotal evidence suggests that some parents at least partially understand this
issue (recall the quotes in Section 2). We look for cross-sectional evidence in the population
in the right hand side of Table 5 which shows what fraction of the ¯rst, second, and
third choices of students are overdemanded that year. At elementary school, 53.4% of
students rank an overdemanded school ¯rst, with competition ¯ercest in the West zone.
Comparing this to fraction of second choices that are overdemanded, we see a signi¯cant
15This is one aspect of the data that we expect would change if a strategy-proof mechanism were introduced;
it would then likely be worthwhile for families to investigate and list more schools.
14drop. Consistent with the idea that ranking an overdemanded school second is a waste,
only 35.7% of K2 applicants rank an overdemanded school as their second choice. Middle
and high school display similar drops in the fraction ranking an overdemanded school
¯rst versus the fraction ranking an overdemanded school second. Of course, a drop in
this percentage could be expected when schools have heterogenous quality and may be
consistent with truthful preference revelation. For instance, students may believe that
a certain school is good and be willing to forsake distance for quality and apply to the
far-away overdemanded school, but for their second choice they will forsake quality for
distance and apply to their underdemanded neighborhood school
More direct evidence of strategic behavior can be obtained by focusing on schools that
are outliers. Recall that one bit of advice given to students by school districts and parent
groups is to rank their true top choice as their ¯rst choice but then to rank a \safe" school
as their second (and third etc.) choices.
Two striking examples in Panel A of Table 6 illustrate this phenomenon. At the
Lyndon and Quincy schools, both widely recognized as good elementary schools in their
zone, a very large number of students ranked the school ¯rst, but then there is a steep
decline in the number who ranked the school second. At the Lyndon, 151 students ranked
it ¯rst and only 45 ranked it second; at the Quincy 187 students ranked it ¯rst and only 35
ranked it second. In both cases, the 45 students ranking the Lyndon and the 35 students
ranking the Quincy could not receive the school if they did not get their ¯rst choice
because there were more applicants ranking the school ¯rst than each school's capacity.
These two schools are outliers relative to the other schools in their respective zones where
the distribution of students ranking schools across choices is much smoother.16
Panel B of Table 6 shows cross-sectional regressions between the di®erence in the
number of students ranking a school ¯rst and the number ranking it second and vari-
ous measures of whether a school is overdemanded. Speci¯cations (1) and (2) proxy for
overdemanded using the ratio of the number of applicants ranking the school ¯rst and
the number of seats, while speci¯cations (3) and (4) consider the di®erence between the
number of students ranking the school ¯rst and its capacity. All four speci¯cations cor-
roborate the pattern suggested in Panel A: the extent of the preference discontinuity is
directly related to whether or not a school is overdemanded. The magnitude of the e®ect,
from speci¯cation (1), for instance, is if there are 2 applicants ranking the school as their
¯rst choice for each seat, then there will be 26 fewer applicants ranking that school second
than a school where there is 1 applicant per seat.
Interestingly, the gap between the ¯rst and second choices of overdemanded zone
schools is either not present or much smaller at overdemanded citywide schools. This is
indicated by the signi¯cance of the citywide dummy in all speci¯cations and is apparent
16At our ¯rst meeting with Boston Public Schools, we were met with some initial skepticism that parents
would state their preferences strategically. We asked which was the most popular elementary school in the city,
and were told it was the Lyndon. We asked if every nearby family ranked it ¯rst, and were told, of course not,
you cannot get into the Lyndon without priority.
15by looking at demand patterns at overdemanded citywide schools. For instance, at the
Hernandez Elementary School which has 42 seats, there are 115 students who rank it ¯rst,
84 who rank it second, and 90 who rank it third. At the Young Achievers Elementary
school which has 38 seats, there are 132 students who rank it ¯rst, 79 who rank it second,
and 86 who rank it third. At Mission Hill, the other citywide elementary school, there are
19 seats, and 30 rank it ¯rst, 32 rank it second, and 40 rank it ¯rst. At the middle school
level, the pattern is even more striking. The largest citywide middle school is the Timilty,
which has 263 seats in 2002. At this school, there are 618 students who rank it ¯rst, 536
who rank it second, and 388 who rank it third. At each of these overdemanded citywide
schools, the students who rank it second, third or lower have absolutely no chance of
receiving an assignment there. This suggests that while most parents understand that
ranking an overdemanded school second when they are at a priority disadvantage is a
bad idea (i.e. when other students have higher priority at that school), fewer parents
understand that ranking second an overdemanded citywide school at which they have no
priority disadvantage is also inadvisable.17
The comparison of local and citywide schools can give us some further insight into the
way parents take into account the Boston mechanism's incentives to misrepresent their
preferences by improving the ranking of schools for which they have high priority.
5.2 Zone Schools vs. Citywide Schools
Consider Figure 2 which shows the location of each applicant for elementary school in
2001-02 with a dot on the map. Compare this ¯gure to Figure 3, which only shows
the students who apply to the six most overdemanded large elementary schools in the
city. Comparing the two ¯gures, we see a concentration of nearby students choosing
overdemanded schools. Naturally, we should expect priorities to both in°uence and be
correlated with preferences, since students value going to nearby schools or where their
sibling attends. The maps only show that nearly all of the students who have priority for
a nearby overdemanded school use that priority in their ¯rst choice.
A clearer way to try to identify the in°uence of priorities on preferences is to compare
students who rank one of the zone schools as their top choices with students who rank
one of the citywide schools as their top choices. Ranking an overdemanded zone school
as the ¯rst choice is a gamble for students unless they have sibling or walk zone priority
(and it may even be a gamble at some schools if the student only has walk zone priority).
At these schools students who live within the walk zone of the school have an advantage
compared to students who do not. Ranking an overdemanded citywide school as the ¯rst
17Because citywide schools draw from all over, one possibility is that parents seeking a citywide school are at
an information disadvantage compared to parents seeking a local school. That is, parents considering a local
school are likely to know parents of slightly older children who have navigated the process in previous years, but
parents looking to send their children out of the local neighborhood may not get the same quality of culturally
transmitted knowledge about the assignment process from their neighbors.
16choice is also a gamble but unlike zone schools, only students with sibling priority have
an advantage. So if parents have been manipulating their submitted preferences to take
advantage of their walk zone priorities, one natural hypothesis is that students who rank
overdemanded zone schools as their ¯rst choices tend to live much closer to their ¯rst
choice school compared to students who rank an overdemanded city wide school as their
¯rst choices.
Fortunately, we can consider this thought experiment by comparing two schools of
similar quality that are close to each other: the Lyndon school, which respects walk zone
priority, and Young Achievers, which is a citywide school. Figure 4 shows the map of
applicants who rank each school as their top choice. Given that the Young Achievers is
a citywide school, we expect applicants to apply from all over the city. What is striking
about this Figure is that very few of the students who live near the Lyndon rank the
Young Achievers ¯rst instead.
Finally, we ask how many students apply to both of these schools as their ¯rst and
second choice. Even though these schools are a six minute drive from each other,18 less
than 5% of the applicants who rank the Lyndon school ¯rst rank Young Achievers second,
and none of the applicants who rank Young Achievers ¯rst rank the Lyndon second. Such
ranking behavior is consistent with some parents realizing that ranking two overdemanded
schools as their ¯rst and second choice is inadvisable.
5.3 Unsophisticated behavior
Without knowing the information available to students at the time they submit their
rank order list and their true underlying preferences, it is di±cult to identify students
who are clearly making mistakes. However, as alluded to in the last section, ranking
two overdemanded schools as a ¯rst and second choice is at least weakly a suboptimal
response, since there is no chance of receiving a place at the second overdemanded school.
This strategy is particularly inadvisable if the student only has random priority at her
¯rst choice so that their odds of receiving it are low.
In Table 7, we report the outcome of students who rank two overdemanded schools as
their ¯rst and second choice and have random priority at their ¯rst choice. This is a risky
strategy because when a student ranks an overdemanded school ¯rst with no priority, if
their second choice was overdemanded, they will not receive it and can do no better than
their third stated choice. The table shows that at elementary school, of the 391 students
ranking two overdemanded schools, 38% receive their ¯rst choice while a third receive a
lower choice, and 29% are unassigned. At middle school, about a third receive their top
choice, a third receive a lower choice and a third are unassigned. In high school, slightly
more students receive their ¯rst choice, but still a third are unassigned.
It is conceivable that a parent who lives in a neighborhood with only low-performing
schools that are underdemanded may ¯nd it in their interest to rank schools that are better
18Travel time calculated from Yahoo!Maps, http://maps.yahoo.com
17and further away. If they are fortunate with their random number, they may secure a
spot and if they are not they can always hope to get their third, fourth or ¯fth choice.
Another reason that someone may rank two overdemanded schools with random priority
at the ¯rst is that they will take a shot for their ¯rst choice and if they do not receive it
they will leave the public school system.
Since we cannot directly observe true preferences, we take a very conservative approach
to identifying unsophisticated behavior, by concentrating on students who are unassigned
by the mechanism, but who do not withdraw from the public school system. Because
Massachusetts State law mandates that a child must attend school beginning in September
of the calendar year in which they turn six years old, a student who does not receive one
of her stated choices is assigned to the school closest to her home that has an available
seat. Since the more desirable school places are usually assigned through Round 1 of the
system, unassigned children are generally sent to schools that are worse than any of their
stated choices.19
5.4 Unassigned students
Ranking two overdemanded schools with random priority at the ¯rst is pretty clearly a
costly mistake when a student ends up unassigned and does not withdraw from Boston
Public Schools 20. As Table 7 shows, a signi¯cant fraction of those who select this action
are unassigned. Indeed, a majority of all unassigned students submitted a rank order with
this property.
In Table 8, we show the number and demographics of students who select this action,
are unassigned and still continue to stay in Boston Public Schools. Notice ¯rst that
115 students were unassigned at elementary school, and 66 stayed in the system. At
middle school, the fraction of unassigned who stayed in the system is even higher. These
students are unlikely to have chosen two overdemanded schools with the intent of taking
a gamble and getting a less desirable but available neighbhorhood school, because they
are unassigned, and are unlikely to have gambled with the intent of leaving the system,
because they remained in the system. In fact, it is likely these students are playing
suboptimally.21
19We focus on unassigned students because the incentives for manipulation created by the Boston mechanism
mean that we cannot simply assume that students would prefer to receive higher ranked choices. (If, say, the
third stated choice gives the student higher utility than the second stated choice, but the perceived odds of
receiving the third stated choice are much lower than the second stated choice, a student may ¯nd it optimal
to °ip the ordering of schools in her preference list.) However, as discussed below, the situation of unassigned
students is much clearer, and we can safely assume that an unassigned student who remains in the system would
have preferred to have received one of her stated choices.
20The nature of this mistake will become even clearer in the next section, when we show how it could be
avoided by the majority of these students.
21Note that we are only considering a very narrow de¯nition of suboptimal play. In principle, if we could
con¯dently identify assigned students who had failed to play the Boston school choice game optimally, we could
18The table shows the demographic patterns of these students. Comparing the distrib-
ution to the overall student population in Table 2, we see that a slightly higher fraction
of students receive a subsidized lunch than the population, and there is a slightly higher
fraction of black students.
Claiming that this action is suboptimal implies that there exists an alternate strategy
that would have done better. One such strategy is ranking a school for which the student
has walk zone priority as their top choice. The odds of receiving such a school will then
be greater than ranking an overdemanded school with random priority. This alternative
action would be undesirable, however, if all of the schools in the walk zone were subpar.
Table 9 shows that this is not the case for these students. The table reports the di®erence
in MCAS reading and math test passing rates at schools for which these students have
walk zone priority, and the school that they were eventually assigned. For instance, of the
66 elementary school applicants, on average an applicant could have ranked a school in
their walk zone with a 65% pass rate instead of the overdemanded ¯rst choice that they did
not have priority for. This school has a 3% better reading score than the school that the
student is eventually assigned. At high school, the di®erence is even more pronounced. A
student could have ranked a school in the walk zone ¯rst with a reading pass rate of 47%,
but by ranking two overdemanded schools as their top choice, they end up at a school
with only 25% pass rate. The di®erence in reading and math test scores is statistically
signi¯cant at middle and high school (p = 0:01), but not at elementary school.
The discussion of Table 9 hinted at alternative strategies that the unassigned students
who ranked two overdemanded schools with random priority at the ¯rst could have played.
We next consider all unassigned students, and ask if they could have been assigned to one
of their ranked schools if they had reordered their preference list.
Table 10 presents summary statistics on the unassigned students. Comparing this
table to Table 2, it appears that unassigned children may belong to any of the city's ethnic
groups and zones, and that the main issue may be whether they ranked overdemanded
schools at the top of their preference lists. The main di®erence however is with the number
of students who withdraw. The fraction of the unassigned who withdraw is much higher
than the withdrawing fraction in the overall student population. This may be due to at
least two e®ects: a causal and a selection e®ect. Students who did not receive any choices
may have left the public school system out of frustration. Or the students who were
unassigned took a gamble and ranked overdemanded schools with the intention of leaving
the system if they did not receive a desirable school. The fact that such a high fraction of
these students ranked three or more choices may suggest that the selection e®ect is less
important, though this is far from conclusive.
To demonstrate the undesirability of being unassigned, Table 11 compares the charac-
identify their demographic characteristics and application strategies. However, since the submitted preferences
may di®er from the true preferences, we choose to focus on a particular subset of students who are playing
suboptimally because we can more con¯dently identify these students.
19teristics of the school a child eventually attends when she is unassigned (Eventual School)
to the average characteristics of that student's stated choices (Desired Schools). The two
columns report the mean MCAS reading and math test scores at the eventual school the
student attends and the their desired school. The di®erence between the eventual school's
test scores and any of the desired school's test scores is statistically signi¯cant. In un-
reported calculations, we also calculated the distance and travel time di®erence. While
the distances are on average larger for these unassigned kids, they are only marginally
signi¯cantly larger. This is consistent with BPS trying to send unassigned children to the
nearest school with un¯lled places.
Both patterns indicate that the nearby school that still has capacity to which an
unassigned student is placed is inferior than the applicant's desired choices. This table
allows us to safely conclude that unassigned students are worse o® than had they been
assigned, and motivates our next exercise.
5.4.1 Individual Deviations (Missed Strategic Opportunities)
Table 13 asks how many of the unassigned students could have received one of their stated
choices with the appropriate advice about how to edit their choice lists, by removing
overdemanded schools from the top place(s) on their list.22 (So, e.g. we do not consider
whether students who listed only one school might have done better by listing more
schools.) Given the evidence presented in Table 11 that the school unassigned students
attend has signi¯cantly lower test scores than one of the stated choices, if an unassigned
student could have been assigned she is no worse o® and likely better o®. Even for
unassigned students who withdraw to private school, they likely prefer to have a school
from the public school system to compare with their outside options rather than having
no comparison school. It is important to note that this exercise is a non-equilibrium one
because it considers individual deviations in isolation and if students can deviate they may
cause other students to be worse o®.23 However, the exercise gives an indirect measure of
22It is also possible that a student who is assigned to her third stated choice or worse could have deviated
in the way we consider here. We have considered such manipulations and we ¯nd 5% more elementary school
students, 28% more middle school students and 35% more high school students could have successfully deviated.
However, focusing on the unassigned is more conservative and only relies on the assumption that stated choices
are better than being unassigned.
23Since students are not made aware of their random number at the time they submit their preferences, a
possibly more appropriate measure may be the expected number of students who could deviate. This requires
computing the outcome of the Boston mechanism for all possible deviations among students who could deviate
over all possible random number combinations. Note as well as with a di®erent draw of random numbers,
there may be additional kids who are unassigned and we must also consider their potential deviations. With
3,326 students in Grade K2, for instance, this corresponds to 3326! possible permutations of students for a
given student who could deviate and so direct computation is infeasible. We have no reason to believe that the
number who could deviate based on the actual random number used by the Boston mechanism would di®er
signi¯cantly than the expected number.
20the extent of pressure on the system and helps to understand the incentives to strategize
among the unassigned.
To conduct this exercise, however, we must be able to reproduce the outcome of the
Boston mechanism. Table 12 presents our replication of the Boston mechanism as a
check on our understanding of the data. The table shows that while we are close to
exactly replicating the outcome of Boston's mechanism, there are still some di®erences.
For grade K2, we do not match 275 assignments (8.3%); for grade 6, we do not match
415 assignments (7.2%); and for grade 9, we do not match 376 assignments (5.9%). After
extensive discussions with BPS sta® about potential sources of discrepancies, we believe
that these fractions are as close as we can get to reproducing their match.24 This issue
will only be relevant for Table 13 presenting an exercise involving only the unassigned
students, and Table 14 which presents a comparison of the various choice mechanisms
using the preference lists submitted under the Boston mechanism.
The ¯rst row of Table 13 shows that for the elementary school level, there are 202
student who are unassigned by BPS. Of these, 159 are candidates for the individual
deviation exercise because they ranked more than 1 school and are also unassigned in our
replication of BPS's allocation. If these students were to have edited the overdemanded
schools from the top of their lists, 64% of them would have been assigned to one of their
stated choices. Most of the unassigned either receive their second or third choice after the
deviation. Returning to the population we have argued is playing suboptimally, we also
consider what fraction could have individually deviated and been assigned. At elementary
school, 61% could have been assigned, 52% at middle school and 67% at high school.
As a measure of the complexity of the advice that parents would need, the last four
columns of Table 13 present the number of schools that must be removed from the top
of the choice list. For the overwhelming majority, simply removing the school that they
ranked ¯rst from their stated preference list would have let them be assigned. In middle
school, where there are a greater number of unassigned students, 222 students could have
received one of their stated choices, with over half getting their second stated choice.
As in elementary school, the advice that these parents would have needed to receive is
fairly simple: remove your top choice from your preference list. The last row of Table 13
con¯rms the same patterns hold in ninth grade.
In summary, Table 13 shows that even with a conservative approach, we can show that
an unassigned student's incentives to deviate are strong. Simple rules of thumb such as
not ranking an overdemanded school as your ¯rst choice would have led many unassigned
24Many of the decisions made in the dataset construction described in the Appendix such as how to treat empty
choice forms were guided by an attempt to match the outcome produced by Boston Public Schools as closely as
possible. Sources of discrepancy are related to the fact that some applicants are assigned administratively and
by hand, a lack of a consistent sibling de¯nition, priorities that are in place that are not re°ected in Boston's
application processing documents such as guaranteed school priority for students who transition to a di®erent
school that is in the same building, and unwritten policies related to the assignment of students to a program
within a school.
21students to receive one of their stated choices.
6 Naive Comparison of the Three Mechanisms:
\First, Do No Harm..."
One of the primary concerns in the design and implementation of a practical matching
mechanism that is likely to a®ect the welfare of thousands of participants is that, at
the very least, it should not harm those it is intended to help. We had two related
sources of potential concern about replacing the Boston mechanism with a strategy-proof
mechanism intended to help families by allowing them to state their true preferences.
The ¯rst concern is that, even if, as seems to be the case, many Boston families have
been manipulating their preferences in response to the strategic incentives of the Boston
mechanism, it might take several years after a strategy-proof mechanism is introduced
before the word-of-mouth advice about how to behave in the old mechanism is replaced
with con¯dence that it is safe to state true preferences. In the meantime, the strategy-
proof mechanism might be allocating students in its ¯rst year or years of operation with
preference lists very much like those currently submitted under the Boston mechanism.
A second concern that would have the same outcome is that we might have misjudged the
extent to which preferences are currently being manipulated. In both cases, we need to
consider how the proposed new mechanisms would perform in case they are implemented
and presented with preferences like those currently being submitted.25
In this section, we ignore the vulnerability of the Boston mechanism to preference
manipulation and compare the outcomes of the three mechanisms using the stated prefer-
ences of Boston students. We will show that for each year and grade, the outcomes of all
three mechanisms are very similar and therefore even if there is no strategic manipulation
in Boston, or if it takes several years for families to learn that they no longer need to
manipulate preferences, adoption of either alternative will not harm the performance of
the assignment system.
Table 14 presents a comparison of the Boston mechanism, student-proposing deferred
acceptance, and the top trading cycles mechanism, under the null hypothesis of no strate-
gic behavior for stated preferences submitted during 2001-02. Since the Boston mechanism
can be thought of as a version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in
which school priorities are adjusted so that after students are prioritized, those who rank
a school ¯rst are elevated over those who rank it second, those who rank it second are
elevated over those who rank it third, etc. it must be the case that the Boston mechanism
is able to place more students in their top choice than the student-proposing deferred
25There is evidence that it takes time for participants to adjust to the use of a new matching mechanism.
In the laboratory, a deferred acceptance mechanism increases the e±ciency of allocation over time (Kagel and
Roth, 2002), and this seems to have occured in the implementation of the New York City high school match,
when we compare the second year of operation with the ¯rst (Abdulkadiro¸ glu, Pathak and Roth, 2005b).
22acceptance mechanism. Moreover, since Table 3 showed that the Boston mechanism is
able to assign a number of students to their top choice, stated preferences overall are
such that there is not much concentration of demand for school spots. As a result, we
anticipate no signi¯cant di®erences between the Boston mechanism and the two strategy-
proof alternatives. The table con¯rms this expectation. For instance, Panel A shows
the patterns at elementary school where 77.9% of students are assigned their top choice
under our replication of the Boston mechanism, while 73.7% are under student-proposing
deferred acceptance and 74.1% are under TTC. The Boston mechanism assigns slightly
more students to their ¯rst choice, but the number of students one of their top three
stated choices is roughly the same across mechanisms. Panels B and C show the pattern
for middle and high school where the patterns are similar.
Comparing the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism to TTC, Table 14
shows that with stated preferences, the latter slightly outperforms the former based on
comparing ¯rst choices. Note as well that fewer are assigned to their second choice under
TTC. As mentioned before, there is no clear Pareto ranking between the student-proposing
deferred acceptance mechanism and TTC. The intuition can be explained in an example
with three students, where all students have walk-zone priority at a school A. Suppose
the ¯rst two students have very good random numbers compared to the third student,
and suppose that the ¯rst and third student both prefer A as their top choice. Under the
student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, the ¯rst and third student are likely
to receive school A, while under TTC the second student may trade her priority with
another for whom school A is not her top choice. This leads the third student not to
receive his top choice, and student-proposing deferred acceptance to assign more students
to their top choice than TTC. Empirically, the slightly better performance of TTC over
student-proposing deferred acceptance using stated choices is not robust. For alternate
years and grades, DAA sometimes performs better.26
It is important not to read the comparison of the three mechanisms presented in Table
14 as a measure of what would happen under each scenario because the simulation uses
stated choices. As we have argued above, there are good reasons to believe that people
are responding to the incentives of the mechanism with manipulated preferences. Thus
we anticipate that, once a strategy-proof mechanism is used, stated preferences will more
closely re°ect true preferences, which should avoid the ine±ciencies that can result when
families strategize with incomplete information. The table, however, shows that even if
stated preferences change only slowly following the change to a strategy-proof mechanism,
we should not anticipate adverse changes to the assignment.
26The comparison of DAA to TTC is also sensitive to exactly how the student population is de¯ned.
237 Changing the mechanism
7.1 Policy discussion
The evidence summarized above convinced sta® members at BPS and the Superintendent
that the current student assignment algorithm should be changed. Central to their re-
form e®orts and their arguments to the Boston School Committee, the ultimate decision
making body for BPS, was the fact that there exists plausible alternate strategy-proof
mechanisms.27 In his memo to the School Committee on May 25, 2005, Superintendent
Payzant wrote:28
The most compelling argument for moving to a new algorithm is to enable
families to list their true choices of schools without jeopardizing their chances
of being assigned to any school by doing so.
Policymakers at Boston Public Schools recognized that the need to strategize in the
current mechanism \provides an advantage to families who have the time, resources and
knowledge to conduct the necessary research." This fairness argument turned out to be
one of the most compelling arguments for policymakers. Superintendent Payzant writes:
A strategy-proof algorithm levels the playing ¯eld by diminishing the harm
done to parents who do not strategize or do not strategize well.
Furthermore, recommendations from BPS identi¯ed the following other bene¯ts of a
transition to a strategy-proof mechanism:
² A strategy-proof mechanism adds \transparency" and clarity to the assignment
process, by allowing for clear and straightforward advice to parents regarding how
to rank schools.29
² There will be potential e±ciency gains (consistent with theory and experiments)
when allocations are based on families' true preferences.
² School o±cials will be able to use the submitted preferences as indicators of family
preferences, to determine which schools are in fact the most highly regarded, and to
estimate the e®ect of policy changes. (e.g. what would happen if some walk zone
boundaries were changed?)
27In many economic and abstract domains the only strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial (Gibbard 1973,
Satterthwaite 1975). But see Abdulkadiro¸ glu and SÄ onmez (1999), Barbera and Jackson (1995), Barbera, Jackson
and Neme (1997), Clarke (1971), Green and La®ont (1979), Groves (1973), Moulin (1994), Moulin and Shenker
(1992), Papai (2000), Roth (1982), Roth, SÄ onmez and Ä Unver (2004, 2005a,b), Sprumont (1991), Vickrey (1961)
for examples of non-dictatorial strategy-proof mechanisms in other resource allocation problems.
28See Superintendent's Memorandum - May 25, 2005 at http://boston.k12.ma.us/assignment/.
29See Recommendation to Implement a new BPS Assignment Algorithm - May 11, 2005 at
http://boston.k12.ma.us/assignment/.
24This last point was particularly important given the current parallel discussion in
Boston about rede¯ning the walk zone boundaries and school zones. Proposals have
ranged from eliminating school choice altogether and having a system of neighborhood
schools to allowing students to apply to any schools in the city.30 One critical input to
this debate is the anticipated transportation costs of busing students across Boston under
each policy scenario. Because the current preference data BPS receives from the school
assignment process has been manipulated due to the incentives the Boston mechanism
gives participants, drawing credible inferences about these issues has proven di±cult.
The following May 11, 2005-dated BPS Memorandum re°ects this frustration:
A resulting bene¯t for the system is that this alternative algorithm would
provide the district with more credible data about school choices, or parent
\demand" for particular schools. Using the current assignment algorithm, we
cannot make assumptions about where families truly wish to enroll based on
the choices they make, knowing many of those choices are strategic rather than
re°ective of actual preference.
Although we had no way of measuring, in the ¯eld data, the ine±ciency of the Boston
mechanism allocation, note that the fact that families appear not to be stating their true
preferences, together with the fact that they are only imperfectly strategizing, strongly
suggests that, as in the experimental laboratory (cf. Chen and Sonmez 2003), the resulting
allocation is ine±cient.
7.2 Choice of strategy-proof mechanism
While the Superintendent recommended the adoption of the student proposing deferred
acceptance procedure to the School Committee, there was also discussion of the alterna-
tive strategy-proof mechanism based on TTC. Indeed, the TTC mechanism was initially
recommended by a taskforce of community members focused on student assignment in
2003 after over a year of community meetings with parents and families.31
Regarding his recommendation to adopt the student-proposing deferred acceptance
mechanism, the Superintendent states:
30See http://boston.k12.ma.us/assignment/ for some of the proposals. Last accessed September 11, 2005.
31At a public School Committee meeting on June 8th, 2005, when we were asked how the Committee and the
public should think about the choice between TTC and deferred acceptance, we replied that a key question was
\In case your child wants to go to the school for which my child has high priority, and my child wants to go to
the school for which your child has a high priority, would anyone mind if they traded priorities?" We pointed
out that this might result in a third family being excluded from a school even though a child with lower priority
was admitted (but in this case the excluded child would have been unlikely to be admitted even in the absence
of a trade). If this was not an objection that outweighed the bene¯ts to the students who traded places, then we
suggested TTC should be the choice, while if this were going to be a big problem, then DA might be preferred.
Initially it appeared that the answer was going to be that no one minded, but as the discussion was broadened
over the following weeks and months, the choice was made to go with the deferred acceptance algorithm.
25Another algorithm we have considered, Top Trading Cycles Mechanism,
presents the opportunity for the priority for one student at a given school
to be \traded" for the priority of a student at another school, assuming each
student has listed the other's school as a higher choice than the one to which
he/she would have been assigned. There may be advantages to this approach,
particularly if two lesser choices can be \traded" for two higher choices. It may
be argued, however, that certain priorities { e.g., sibling priority { apply only
to students for particular schools and should not be traded away. Moreover,
Top Trading Cycles is less transparent{ and therefore more di±cult to explain
to parents { because of the trading feature executed by the algorithm, which
may perpetuate the need or perceived need to \game the system."
Central to the theoretical discussion of TTC versus student proposing deferred accep-
tance was the tradeo® between justi¯ed envy and e±ciency. The above quotation re°ects
an additional, related concern: the uneasiness of BPS to allow priorities to be traded, par-
ticularly where sibling priority is involved.32 It also re°ects concern that the mechanism
that is adopted should be one that can be easily and clearly explained and defended.
Whether the TTC mechanism would indeed have been less transparent and more
di±cult to explain to parents would ultimately depend on how much e®ort the school
district makes to communicate the relevant properties of the mechanism. With either
strategy-proof mechanism, it should be easier to advise students to rank schools truthfully
without requiring them to understand the technical details of the assignment algorithm.
Once the strategy-proof deferred acceptance mechanism has been in place for a few
years, so that submitted preferences are more likely to correspond to true preferences, we
hope to be able to more meaningfully compare TTC and deferred acceptance, and better
understand how and how much the allocations that they produce may di®er with respect
to true preferences.
7.3 Implementing a new mechanism: Communication
Since the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism does not penalize students
for ranking schools at which they do not have high priority, it is likely that students will
rank more schools, including choices for which they have only a low probability of being
admitted. As a result, BPS needs to prepare the public and itself for the political rami¯-
cations of fewer students receiving their top stated choice. And in general, communication
32There is sometimes a gap in intuitions between economists and non-economists about what kinds of things
should and should not be traded. As with the reservations about the trading of sibling preferences, these
perceptions can play a big role in what kinds of market designs are possible. For example, the need for kidney
exchange arises in part from the fact that in most countries of the world it is not permitted to buy or sell organs
(Roth et al. 2004,5). In a similar way, we do not expect to see school choice mechanisms in which families bid
money for places in the most desirable schools in a direct way. Of course, economists have long recognized that
there can be an implicit price to certain schools based on the costs of living in certain neighborhoods.
26with the community is a big part of implementing a new mechanism. The advantages of
strategy proofness would be lost if it is not e®ectively communicated to the community
that under the new mechanism, in contrast to the old one, families will not su®er bad
consequences from revealing their true preferences.
In his September 12, 2005 memo, Superintendent Payzant wrote the following list of
items BPS needs to communicate to the community:
² The new school assignment formula enables families to indicate their true choices of
schools, in order of preferences, without regard to the size or popularity of the school.
² Unlike in past years, families do not have to (in fact, should not) \strategize" about
which schools to rank ¯rst, second or third based on the presumed likelihood of
getting a seat.
² When ranking schools, families do not have to factor into their decision-making how
many other families will choose a particular school, which priorities their student has
to the school, how many siblings are likely to apply, or how high or low a random
number their student may draw.
² Rather, families should indicate their true preferences, in order, based on their own
research about the quality of the school and its appropriateness for the personal and
educational needs of their child.
² The most e®ective means of learning about a school and determining whether or not
it is a good ¯t is to visit the school and talk to the principal, teachers, parents and
students.
² Families should list as many schools as possible (ideally, more than 6 schools) in
order to increase the likelihood of receiving an assignment to one of their choices.
Families should register as early as they are eligible to do so, for the best chance of
getting schools of their choice.
8 Conclusion
One of the interesting challenges involved in moving from a school choice mechanism
with bad incentives to one that makes it safe for families to list their true preferences is
that the Boston school choice system was not broken in an obvious way. Rather, each
year students were assigned to schools in an orderly manner, with a very high proportion
getting their stated ¯rst choice. In this respect, Boston was like a patient with high blood
pressure, a potentially deadly disease that has no easily visible symptoms.33
33This is in contrast to some other recent design projects in which there was an obvious market failure to be
repaired, e.g. the lack of a thick market resulting in very few kidney exchanges (Roth et al. 2004, 2005), or the
unraveling that reduced mobility in the market for gastroenterologists (Niederle and Roth, 2003, 2005), or the
congestion in the old New York City high school admission process (Abdulkadiro¸ glu et al. 2005b). To carry
27The challenge to investigating the nature of strategic play is that, since the Boston
mechanism isn't strategy proof, our data didn't allow us to know the true preferences
behind the submitted preferences. So, we can't hope to detect the full incidence either of
strategic manipulation, or of the families who failed to manipulate as successfully as they
could have.34 Instead, we concentrated on showing that there are subsets of families who
have manipulated their preferences, and others who could have pro¯ted by submitting
di®erent preferences. For the ¯rst conclusion, we showed that some families take account
of their priorities when submitting their preferences by looking at the location of families
listing as their ¯rst choice two nearby, overdemanded schools, one with and one without
walk zone preference. For the second conclusion, we looked at the students who fared
worst, those who received administrative assignments to schools with excess capacity, and
showed that a large proportion of them could have been admitted to one of the schools
they had listed, if they had not made the mistake of listing one or more overdemanded
schools at the top of their lists.
While the available data do not permit us to assess the size of the potential welfare
loss (as we can in laboratory data), what we could show was that many parents appeared
to be responding to the strategic incentives to misrepresent their preferences, although
many were without all the information that would be needed to do this well. This is
precisely the behavior that, in the laboratory where we can measure e±ciency losses,
causes ine±ciency in the resulting matchings. The quotes from the West Zone Parents
Group in Appendix 2 further suggest that this misrepresentation of preferences was in
many cases a costly process in itself (involving e.g. the gathering of intelligence on how
many siblings would enter a given school that year). Moreover, remarks at the parent
hearing on the allocation mechanism presented in Appendix 3 indicate that some parents
resented having to strategize and that caused parents to lose trust in the public school
system. In addition, the fact that preferences are manipulated, well or badly, means
that the preference lists available to school o±cials are not reliable indicators of parents'
preferences.
A strategy-proof mechanism has an advantage over the Boston mechanism in that, in
contrast to the Boston mechanism, it would
² Allow families to list choices in order of true preferences.
² Make it easy to give parents correct advice about how to ¯ll out their preference
lists.
² Not penalize parents who are not sophisticated about the school choice process or
well informed about which schools are overdemanded.
on the analogy, those problems were like a patient with a heart attack, where the best treatment might not be
obvious, but there was little dispute that treatment was needed.
34The case of a family that receives its stated ¯rst choice makes both points clear. This could be their true
¯rst choice. But if it is not, then they could have pro¯ted from deviating from their true preferences, or been
harmed, but this cannot be known from the data.
28² Allow parents to spend their time visiting schools and assessing teachers, rather than
researching the levels of competition for each school spot.
² Give school o±cials a more reliable indicator of parent preferences, which can be
used not only to match students to schools, but to assess how policy changes such
as a change in the borders of walk zones would in°uence which children would be
likely to be assigned to which schools.
There are also a number of conclusions we can draw from the Boston experience that
have implications for other school districts, and, more generally, for other market design
problems.
First, there are quite a few other school districts with student assignment sys-
tems sharing the main features of the Boston mechanism, for example Cambridge,
Charlotte-Mecklenberg, Denver, Miami-Dade, Rochester, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and
White Plains.35 Based on our analysis of the behavior of Boston families, it seems likely
that in these other school districts parents are faced with solving a complex strategic
problem, rather than just a problem of forming preferences over schools. A strategy-proof
mechanism like top trading cycles or the deferred acceptance mechanism would lift this
strategic burden from parents, and makes the school choice process more transparent.
School choice is often a sensitive political issue, and transparency helps to remove some
aspects of how to best assign children to schools from the political arena to the technical
arena, and clarify which issues remain to be settled by the political process. There will
always be such issues, since until there are enough top quality school places to satisfy
all families, some aspects of school choice will be a distributive process, with only some
students able to gain admission to the most desirable schools. But school assignment
is far from zero sum, since di®erent students (in di®erent locations, and with di®erent
needs) will have di®erent preferences.36
Our analysis of strategic behavior in Boston also serves to emphasize the fact (lost
in some theoretical discussions of mechanism design) that, in complex environments, not
all players may be responding optimally to the strategic incentives of the system, i.e.
the system need not elicit equilibrium behavior. The policy discussion that developed
in Boston showed that one advantage of strategy-proof mechanisms is that they level the
playing ¯eld between the strategically sophisticated and well informed and those who may
be unsophisticated or poorly informed. For policymakers in Boston, this proved to be a
major point that led to the successful adoption of the new system.
In this connection, there are also good reasons to believe that, once the strategy-proof
mechanism is put into operation in 2006, the adjustment to straightforward statement of
preferences may not be immediate. So another desirable property of both the proposed
35See Hastings, Kane, and Steiger (2005) for a study of the e®ect of school choice in Charlotte-Mecklenberg
on student achievement.
36Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2003), for instance, report that in an open enrollment plan in Chicago was
successful at matching idiosyncratic tastes of parents and students and improving social circumstances.
29mechanisms is that, if behavior is slow to adjust to the new dominant-strategy equilibrium
of truthful revelation of preferences, no harm will be done during the transition period.
That is, the success of the new mechanism does not depend on the complete and immediate
success of the education and communication that must accompany the introduction of the
new mechanism.
Overall, one lesson from the Boston experience is that mechanism design in a political
environment requires that not only policy makers themselves be persuaded of the virtues
of a new design, but that they be able to explain and defend the mechanism to the various
constituencies they serve. Thus a desirable property of any proposed mechanism is that
it should be simple, and easy to understand and communicate.
In summary, no mechanism can ensure that families will all receive their ¯rst choice
school. However, there are better ways to allocate students to a ¯xed stock of school places
than the current Boston mechanism. It proved possible to organize the game-theoretic
arguments and empirical evidence in a way that could be e®ectively communicated to both
policy makers and their public constituencies.37 In the coming years, as the new Boston
mechanism goes into operation, it should become possible to draw stronger conclusions
about future modi¯cations to the system, as it becomes safe for families to report their
true preferences, so that more reliable information about family preferences and welfare
will become available.
37This stands in contrast to the view espoused by Rubinstein (2005) in his presidential address to the Econo-
metric Society, where he writes, \I believe that as an economic theorist I have very little to say which is of
relevance in the real world and I do believe that there are very few models in economic theory that could be
used to provide serious advice."
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349 Appendices
Appendix 1: Data de¯nitions and priorities
We utilize a proprietary database of student choices and geographic characteristics for the
school years 2000-2004 provided by Boston Public Schools for this study.
Student population: The population consists of students who submit preferences
in Round 1 with a complete form, and students who receive a guaranteed assignment
(to their present school) in round R in June of the school year. We assume that these
latter students have elected to stay in their present school. To keep only students with
complete application forms, if the assignment method is I for incomplete application or R
for returned application, the record is deleted. Each year there are also student records
with empty choice forms. The majority of these students continue to stay in their current
school, which is either a combined elementary and middle school (grades K2-8) or middle
and high school (grades 6-12). For students with an empty ¯rst choice, we have the
following rules: If the method is A for guarantee assignment (to present school), the ¯rst
choice is set to their guaranteed school. If the method is D for administratively assigned,
the record is deleted. If the method is E for East Boston guarantee student, we append
the guaranteed school at the end of the choice list, if it is not already there. If the method
is G, the blank ¯rst choice is set to the assigned school. If the method is H and the ¯rst
choice is blank, then the record is deleted. Students with methods D or H and blank ¯rst
choices are mainly those with special needs. If the method is N and ¯rst choice is blank,
the record is deleted. If the method is U for unassigned and the ¯rst choice is blank, the
record is deleted.
For purposes of simulating the algorithms, student preference lists are modi¯ed for
each choice to actually rank two programs, one corresponding to the half of the school
where walk zone priority applies and the other to where it does not. The walk zone half
is always placed ahead of the other half for students who have walk zone priority at the
school, and vice versa for students who do not.
Unassigned students are those who are labeled unassigned, administratively assigned,
or hand assigned (methods U,D, and H, respectively), have been assigned in the ¯nal pass
(run=90) or to their sixth choice, which is not in the dataset (run=95), or are assigned
to a September school that is not one of their choice schools.
Capacities: School capacities are calculated as the number of assigned students to a
school from the student population de¯ned above. At the elementary and middle school
level, each school is split into a walk zone priority half and the half where walk zone
priority does not apply. If there is an additional seat, it is given to the walk zone half.
Priorities: The actual priority ordering of the Boston mechanism was constructed
from the Controlled Choice Application Rules of the Records Management Unit of the
Boston Public Schools and extensive discussions with the sta® of Boston Public schools.
For the half of the school seats where walk zone priority applies, students are ordered
35into indi®erence classes where random numbers are used to break ties. Among students
who rank a school ¯rst, students applying from the walk zone are ordered by priority
according to guaranteed, sibling-present school, sibling, present school, students who live
in a geocode without a walk zone school (non-walk priority) and no priority. Then students
without walk zone priority ranking the school ¯rst are ordered according to guaranteed,
sibling-present school, sibling, present school, non-walk priority, and random. The next
set of indi®erence classes are students who rank the school second. Among the walk zone
students, ¯rst are those with siblings followed by those without. The next set of students
rank the school second without walk zone priority. These students are ordered according
to sibling, non-walk priority, and no priority. The next class are those who rank the school
as their third choice. These students are ordered as walk-sibling, walk, sibling, no priority.
The same ordering applies for the remaining choices ordered by choice.
At the half of the school where walk zone priority is ignored, the students are ordered
according to to guarantee, sibling-present school, sibling, present school, and no priority.
Then, students who rank the school second according to sibling, non-walk priority, and no
priority. Then, students who rank the school third according to sibling and no priority.
The same ordering applies for the remaining choices.
The dataset provided by Boston Public Schools includes a sibling indicator if a student
was assigned to their school via sibling priority. This is how we identify which school
students are eligible for sibling priority. Note that it is possible we miss situations where
a student applies to a school with sibling priority and does not receive a spot. This only
happens, however, if there are more siblings applying to the school as their ¯rst choice
than priority seats available and thus only applies to less than one percent of seats. After
substantial experimentation constructing our own sibling de¯nitions, we believe that the
BPS sibling indicator is the most accurate measure of sibling priority. The dataset also
includes a student's geocode and a mapping of geocodes to walk zone priority from which
we determined whether a student was eligible for walk zone priority at a given school.
Finally, the random number we use to break indi®erences in priority is the same number
provided by BPS.
Appendix 2: Quotes from West Zone Parents Group
The West Zone Parents Group (WZPG) is a volunteer group of parents who either have
children in Boston Public Schools or are considering enrolling their children. The group
is open to anyone who wants to participate. Members meet to share information and help
one another understand the process of choosing and registering for a school in Boston.
The group hosts an email group, westzoneparents, on the internet site Ya-
hoo!Groups that serves as a supplement to meetings and is a way for people to com-
municate and share information between meetings. The archived history of the group is
available, and was last accesssed on June 17, 2005.
36The following excerpts from posted messages are regarding strategic behavior related
to the Boston assignment mechanism:
² WZPG Parent correspondence, 1/22/2004, Subject: your input
For those of you considering putting the Haley as a ¯rst choice, ... you may
want to put a safer school second than you had been planning to, in case the
momentum builds even more than you had expected. You'll probably be ¯ne
and automatically get it as a ¯rst cohice, but you may want to still play it
safe.
² WZPG Parent correspondence, 1/28/2005, Subject: Re: Philbrick School
Have you gotten any sense if a lot of people are choosing the Philbrick as a
1st choice? We really like Philbrick ... but are not in the walk zone. We are
putting Manning 1st since we're in the walk zone and Philbrick 2nd but I'm
getting very nervous that Philbrick has gotten so popular that it might only
be a good #1 selection. We're also looking for a good safety for 4th place,
perhaps Hale or Mendell.
² WZPG Parent correspondence, 1/28/2005, Subject: Re: Philbrick School
I think there are probably 2-3 siblings entering K2 [at the Philbrick]. I know
of 2 people who are putting it as a ¯rst choice... I don't know what to say|
according to last year's numbers, putting it second would be safe, but the
year we applied, only ¯rst choice people got in. I think it would be okay if
your third choice were a VERY safe bet.
² WZPG Parent correspondence, 1/30/2005, Subject: Re: Philbrick School
We're also having trouble with deciding on a secure 2nd choice. We are
struggling with deciding between the Manning and the Haley for our 1st
choice. They are both in our walk zone but for logistics and time ... the
Manning works best for our family. We really loved the Haley but I'm afraid
that it is not a safe 2nd choice anymore.
² WZPG Parent correspondence, 4/5/2005, Subject: Sumner K1- poll
Our son is in a great Montessori program and I am reluctant to pull him out
even though I was very impressed with the Sumner... our \true" ¯rst choice
would be a K2 that is closer to our home...
37Appendix 3: Comments from Public Hearing
On June 8th, 2005 the Boston School Committee held a public hearing on the assignment
algorithm. There were six comments, two of which argued for increased transparency
in the system, one which argued against the change, one who was upset with their
assignment and the remaining two were from community members who had been involved
in the controlled choice a decade earlier but were no longer a±liated with Boston
Public Schools. These last two statements were as follows (Source: Audio Recording of
Public Hearing on Assignment Algorithm, June 8, 2005, obtain from School Committee
Executive Secretary Laurie Ciardi):
Comment 1:
It [changing assignment algorithms] is a long time coming. I'm extremely
pleased to see the adopting of an assignment method that does not penalize
students for ranking one school over another. I was very involved with the
student assignment process: I was on a taskforce back in 1985, was co-chair
of a taskforce on K2s, and have been pushing for a method like for 20 years.
I totally agree with a method where you don't penalize students for ranking
a particular school.
Comment 2:
[..] I have participated in the selection process 12 times with 4 di®er-
ent children. I was one of the gang of 6 who drafted the assignment
process with Chuck Willie and Michael Alves. I have been waiting 16 years
for this vote. This [The assignment algorithm] is one issue that I had lost on.
I ¯nd the current system of maximizing ¯rst choice to be insidious and
destructive. I urge each school committee member to vote enthusiastically
for this new algorithm proposal. [...] My wife and I take dozens of phone
calls around choice time in Dorchester. We have to tell people that it
doesn't make sense to choose our children's elementary school. And that is
absurd. And the people who get that advice get very angry. [...] Because to
get into the O'Hearn you need to be luckier than megabucks. So I have to
say [to these parents], don't make your ¯rst choice your ¯rst choice. That's
enraging. It is at the bottom of the anger that you [the School Committee]
get from West Roxbury.
38But it is even more cruel and unusual for `non-savvy' parents. And I've
never met anyone who was savvy after ten minutes who wasn't just angry.
It's the Timilty problem. I've never chosen the Timilty middle school for
my four children. I'm very happy with the McCormick and Rogers, but
I knew it would be a bad mistake because if you choose the Timilty your
risk of getting an administrative assignment goes up astronomically. That's
wrong because if you don't know this, your chances of choosing your ¯rst
choice and getting an administrative assignment skyrocket.
It angers the parents who ¯gure it out because they are told not to make their
¯rst choice the ¯rst one. And it hurts those who don't ¯gure it out because
they choose a popular school and end up in the administrative assignment
bin.
This new system [...] will heal the problem and quelch the anger.
We will be able to give parents good advice. They will make more choices
because they will not be confused. More importantly, they will not be harmed.
The maximizing ¯rst choice system is harmful to parents. I urge you to
change it by supporting the Superintendent's recommendation.
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aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data obtained from Boston Public Schools. School population deﬁned as all schools open to students
through assignment process. Student population deﬁned as students with valid application form applying for the 2001-2002 school year, who
have submitted their preferences in round 1 by February for a school spot in fall 2002. Additional details on deﬁnition of student population
in appendix.
bElementary school deﬁned as schools oﬀering grade K2 (must be 6 years old on or before September 1, 2002) and includes Early Learning
Centers (ELC) and K-8 programs. Middle schools deﬁned as grade 6 and high deﬁned as grade 9. Continuing schools such as those which
cover grades K-8 or 6-12 are treated as two separate schools.Table 2— 2001-2002 Student Characteristicsa
Subsidized Race
Number Lunch Female Black White Hisp. Other Bilingual Withdrewb
Elementary school applicants
East 1,264 71% 50% 60% 12% 18% 9% 12% 14%
North 1,072 75% 51% 22% 17% 45% 15% 25% 12%
West 990 60% 51% 33% 26% 37% 4% 15% 16%
Total 3,326 69% 50% 40% 18% 32% 10% 17% 14%
Middle school applicants
East 2,383 77% 48% 64% 10% 18% 8% 8% 10%
North 1,568 80% 50% 27% 16% 43% 14% 11% 10%
West 1,478 77% 52% 48% 13% 37% 3% 12% 11%
Total 5,429 78% 49% 48% 13% 30% 9% 9% 10%
High school applicants
Total 6,380 65% 49% 48% 16% 27% 8% 11% 14%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data obtained from Boston Public Schools. Gender, race, bilingual and withdrawal status calculated
from student ﬁle in the following year. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix.
bStudents who withdraw may either attend parochial, private or charter schools or have moved outside BPS, withdrew with unknown
status or left the system for other reasons (expulsion, illness, pregnancy, etc.)Table 3— 2001-2002 Stated Choice Receiveda
Top Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice 5th Choice Unassignedb
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Elementary school applicants
East 1,010 80% 101 8% 47 4% 27 2% 16 1% 63 5%
North 883 82% 100 9% 25 2% 13 1% 3 0% 48 4%
West 705 71% 100 10% 59 6% 21 2% 14 1% 91 9%
Total 2,598 78% 301 9% 131 4% 61 2% 33 1% 202 6%
Middle school applicants
East 1,894 79% 128 5% 125 5% 29 1% 14 1% 193 8%
North 1,153 74% 157 10% 65 4% 22 1% 3 0% 168 11%
West 1,110 75% 130 9% 104 7% 10 1% 9 1% 115 8%
Total 4,157 77% 415 8% 294 5% 61 1% 26 0% 476 9%
High school applicants
Total 5,497 86% 428 7% 100 2% 42 1% 11 0% 302 5%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix.
bUnassigned students are those who are either hand assigned or receive a school that is not on their preference list.Table 4— 2001-2002 Priority Eligibility at Assigned Schoola
Guaranteed Sibling-Walk Sibling Walkb No Priority
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Elementary school applicants
East 218 17% 147 12% 126 10% 317 25% 393 31%
North 159 15% 156 15% 71 7% 305 29% 333 31%
West 137 14% 84 8% 113 11% 266 27% 299 30%
Total 514 16% 387 12% 310 9% 888 27% 1,025 31%
Middle school applicants
East 669 28% 56 2% 97 4% 585 25% 783 33%
North 495 32% 49 3% 66 4% 390 25% 400 26%
West 418 28% 53 4% 62 4% 358 24% 472 32%
Total 1,582 29% 158 3% 225 4% 1,333 24% 1,655 30%
High school applicants
Total 3,297 52% 105 2% 150 2% 844 13% 1,682 26%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix.
bStudents who live in geocodes with no walk zone schools, but are assigned via non-walk priority are counted as receiving walk priority.Table 5— 2001-2002 Applicant Strategiesa
Over Over Over
# schools ranked -demandedb -demanded -demanded
1 2 3 4 5 1st 2nd 3rd
Elementary school applicants
East 19% 3% 40% 14% 23% 49% 35% 29%
North 18% 9% 51% 10% 11% 53% 30% 22%
West 14% 3% 48% 13% 22% 60% 43% 35%
Total 17% 5% 46% 13% 19% 53% 36% 28%
Middle school applicants
East 31% 4% 48% 7% 10% 68% 44% 37%
North 38% 9% 41% 6% 5% 45% 33% 25%
West 31% 5% 47% 9% 8% 62% 42% 32%
Total 33% 6% 46% 7% 8% 60% 40% 32%
High school applicants
Total 52% 2% 32% 6% 8% 38% 21% 16%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix. There
are 2 students in grade 6 who rank ﬁve schools and are assigned to their unranked guaranteed North zone middle school. We treat these
students as ranking ﬁve choices despite appending their guaranteed choice school to their preference list for the mechanism simulations.
bA choice is overdemanded if a student ranked a program as their nth choice for n = 1,2,3 when the number of students who ranked that
school ﬁrst that year was greater than the total capacity. If a choice is empty, it is by deﬁnition not overdemanded.Table 6— 2001-2002 Grade K2 Preference Discontinuitiesa
Panel A: Discontinuity at Speciﬁc Schools
Number Number Number
School Seats ranking 1st ranking 2nd ranking 3rd
Lyndon 50 151 45 30
Other West Zone 940 839 655 604
Quincy 112 187 35 28
Other North Zone 960 885 679 574
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix.Table 6— 2001-2002 Grade K2 Preference Discontinuities (cont.)
Panel B: Discontinuity in the Cross-sectiona
Dependent Variable:
∆i = Number Ranking i First - Number Ranking i Second
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overdemand1
b 26.43 26.61 - -
(4.92) (5.00)
Overdemand2
c - - 0.941 0.944
(0.093) (0.094)
Citywide dummy -19.60 -19.09 -33.40 -32.57
(15.88) (16.20) (12.07) (12.30)
Zone dummies N Y N Y
N 85 85 85 85
R2-adj 0.260 0.279 0.554 0.566
aNote: Table presents regressions of the diﬀerence in the number of students ranking a school ﬁrst and the number of students
ranking a school second on proxies for whether that school was overdemanded, a citywide dummy variable, and zone dummies.
Speciﬁcations (1) and (3) include an intercept. Standard errors in parenthesis.
bOverdemand1 is the ratio of the number of students ranking school ﬁrst to school’s total capacity.
cOverdemand2 is the diﬀerence between the number of students ranking school ﬁrst and the school’s total capacity.Table 7— 2001-2002 Ranking Two Overdemanded Schools with Random Priority at the Firsta
Received 1st Choice Received Other Choice Unassigned
Total Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Elementary school applicants 391 147 38% 129 33% 115 29%
Middle school applicants 1,035 351 34% 327 32% 357 34%
High school applicants 555 253 46% 114 21% 188 34%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix. Boston
Public schools reports that in this population there are 3 students who receive their second choice in elementary school, 24 who receive their
second choice in middle school, and 9 in high school. It is impossible for these students to receive their second choice under the Boston
mechanism as described; this discrepancy is the result either of a miscoded assignment or an error in the priority structure for these students.
In our simulated Boston mechanism presented in Table 12, none of these students receive their second choice.Table 8— 2001-2002 Unassigned Students with Top Two Choices
Overdemanded with Random Priority at First in Systema
Zone Subsidized Race
Total East North West Lunch Female Black White Hisp. Other Bilingual
Elementary school applicants
Unassigned 66 32 8 26 71% 47% 60% 20% 20% 0% 6%
Middle school applicants
Unassigned 249 127 61 61 81% 51% 62% 7% 26% 6% 2%
High school applicants
Unassigned 143 82 21 40 71% 66% 59% 5% 28 % 7% 1%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix. When
demographic information is missing, it is unreported.Table 9— 2001-2002 Diﬀerences in MCAS Passing Rates at Schools for Unassigned Students
with Top Two Choices Overdemanded with Random Priority at First in Systema
MCAS Reading Passing Rateb MCAS Math Passing Rate
Average for Average for Average for Average for
Walk Priority Eventually Assigned Walk Priority Eventually Assigned
School School School School
Elementary school 65% 62% 51% 50%
applicants
Middle school 68% 63% 20% 16%
applicants
High school 47% 25% 20% 14%
applicants
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix.
bMassachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) reading and math scores correspond to school-wide averages in 2000. For
grade K2, the score refers to the fourth grade test, for grade 6, the score refers to the eighth grade test, and for grade 9, the score refers to
the tenth grade test. This is the information available in the 2001 School Guide used when applicants make their choices.Table 10— 2001-2002 Unassigned Student Characteristicsa
Fraction
Ranking Subsidized Race
Number ≥ 3 Lunch Female Black White Hisp. Other Bilingual Withdrewb
Elementary school applicants
East 63 86% 48% 45% 62% 21% 14% 3% 5% 37%
North 48 73% 50% 54% 19% 31% 40% 10% 21% 46%
West 91 91% 73% 51% 24% 56% 14% 7% 2% 61%
Total 202 85% 61% 50% 34% 39% 20% 7% 8% 50%
Middle school applicants
East 193 91% 69% 52% 73% 6% 16% 5% 2% 26%
North 168 81% 74% 58% 43% 12% 35% 9% 2% 26%
West 115 85% 51% 49% 51% 15% 32% 3% 3% 35%
Total 476 86% 67% 53% 57% 10% 27% 6% 2% 28%
High school applicants
Total 302 93% 64% 61% 60 % 8% 25% 6% 1% 23%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix. When
demographic information is missing, it is unreported.
bStudents who withdraw may either attend parochial, private or charter schools or have moved outside BPS, withdrew with unknown
status or left the system for other reasons (expulsion, illness, pregnancy, etc.)Table 11— 2001-2002 Diﬀerences in Schools’ MCASa
Passing Rates Schools for Unassigned
MCASb Reading MCAS Math
Pass Rate Pass Rate
Elementary school applicants
Eventual schoolc 63% 50%
Desired schoolsd 73% 67%
Middle school applicants
Eventual school 63% 16%
Desired schools 82% 36%
High school applicantse
Eventual school 23% 14%
Desired schools 32% 16%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on deﬁnition of student population in appendix.
Passing rate at the ranked schools is larger than eventual school with p-value of 0.01.
bMassachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) reading and math scores correspond to school-wide averages in 2000. For
grade K2, the score refers to the fourth grade test, for grade 6, the score refers to the eighth grade test, and for grade 9, the score refers to
the tenth grade test. This is the information available in the 2001 School Guide used when applicants make their choices.
cEventual school is the school the student is in in June of the following school year, if the student is still in the system.
dDesired school is any school on an unassigned student’s rank order list. The pass rates for desired schools are averaged across schools
ranked.
eSpecialized high schools such as Boston Latin are not included in this sample because they are not assigned through the centralized
admissions process.Table 12 — 2001-2002 Replication of Boston Mechanisma
Stated Fraction
Choice Received 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Unassigned Diﬀerent
Elementary school applicants
Boston 2,599 301 131 61 33 202
Our Replication 2,590 309 103 23 12 289 8.3%
Middle school applicants
Boston 4,170 411 298 61 26 473
Our Replication 4,197 417 269 44 17 485 7.6%
High school applicants
Boston 5,497 428 100 42 11 301
Our Replication 5,483 407 158 38 6 285 5.9%
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on construction of student population in the appendix.Table 13— Individual Deviations for Unassigned Studentsa
Number Number Percent Stated choice received # of choices
Number of unassigned who could who after deviation removed
applicants by BPS deviateb beneﬁt 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1 2 3 4
Elementary school 3,326 202 159 64% 49 33 12 7 78 16 6 1
applicants
Middle school 5,429 473 362 61% 115 72 23 12 168 40 11 3
applicants
High school 6,380 301 198 84% 89 69 7 2 115 45 6 1
applicants
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on implementation of algorithms and the
deﬁnition of student population in the appendix. An individual deviation for this table is deﬁned as submitted a rank order list that
diﬀers from the actual list by removing the ﬁrst n schools from the top of the list, where n = 1,2,3,4. Students who beneﬁt are those
who receive one of their stated choices after an individual deviation.
bStudents who could deviate are those who are both unassigned by BPS and by our replication of BPS’s allocation who rank at
least two schools and are unassigned.Table 14— 2001-2002 Naive Comparison of Mechanismsa
Stated Boston Student-proposing Top Trading
Choice Mechanism Deferred Acceptance Cycles Mechanism
number percent number percent number percent
Panel A: Elementary school applicants
1st 2,590 77.9 2,451 73.7 2,464 74.1
2nd 309 9.3 419 12.6 410 12.3
3rd 103 3.1 173 5.2 171 5.1
4th 23 0.7 55 1.7 55 1.7
5th 12 0.4 23 0.7 23 0.7
Unassigned 289 8.7 205 6.2 203 6.1
Panel B: Middle school applicants
1st 4,197 77.3 3,922 72.2 3,938 72.5
2nd 417 7.7 701 12.9 689 12.7
3rd 269 5.0 328 6.0 317 5.8
4th 44 0.8 75 1.4 68 1.3
5th 17 0.3 23 0.4 23 0.4
Unassigned 485 8.9 380 7.0 394 7.3
Panel C: High school applicants
1st 5,486 86.0 5,261 82.5 5,328 83.5
2nd 407 6.4 624 9.8 587 9.2
3rd 158 2.5 236 3.7 202 3.2
4th 38 0.6 36 0.6 31 0.5
5th 6 0.1 7 0.1 6 0.1
Unassigned 285 4.5 216 3.4 226 3.5
aNotes: Statistics tabulated using data provided by Boston Public Schools. Details on construction of student population in the
appendix. All three mechanisms deﬁned in main text and priority structure deﬁned in the appendix. The numbers for the Boston
mechanism refer to our replication of the mechanism, not the outcome from the actual mechanism.